The Metaphysics of Human Freedom: From Kant's Transcendental Idealism to Schelling's Freiheitsschrift by Gardner, S
1 
 
 
 
The Metaphysics of Human Freedom: From Kant's Transcendental Idealism 
to Schelling's Freiheitsschrift 
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'How must a world be constituted for a moral being?' 
('Oldest System-Programme', 1796/97)1 
 
Schelling's 1809 Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom, 
known as the Freiheitsschrift, marks a turning point in his development – the end of his 
attempt to define a satisfactory form of absolute idealism, and the beginning of his late 
philosophy, by any measure one of the most demanding parts of German Idealism.2 The 
treatise is short but its scope could hardly be broader. In addition to the one announced 
in its title, topics discussed in it include pantheism and philosophical systematicity, 
moral psychology, good and evil, the nature of God, identity and predication, and the 
nature of being. Schelling's treatment of these themes evidences a change of key, 
employing idioms and drawing on resources alien to the modern philosophical tradition, 
as if he were embarking on a new type of metaphysical speculation – making it no 
accident that Heidegger seized on the work and declared it the summit of German 
Idealism.3 
 In this paper I make the case that Schelling's central claims in the 
Freiheitsschrift can be regarded as the product of a complex and extended development 
arising out of Kant's theory of freedom. This is not quite how Schelling presents it. As 
he describes the overall aim of the treatise, it is concerned with the problem, more easily 
recognized as attaching to Spinoza's legacy than to Kant's, of incorporating an adequate 
conception of human freedom within the system of philosophy, where system is 
understood to carry implications of completeness and finality.4 This is however, as I 
will try to show, fully compatible with interpreting Schelling as taking over where Kant 
leaves off, for it is precisely in their encounter with Spinozism that the limitations of 
Kant's metaphysics of freedom are revealed. Because I am approaching the 
Freiheitsschrift from a somewhat specific angle, my treatment of it here will not amount 
to a comprehensive view of the work, and many important ideas contained in it will not 
receive discussion, although they are not, I believe, inconsistent with the interpretation I 
offer. To root the speculative claims of the Freiheitsschrift in a Kantian problematic is 
of course not to contest the originality and autonomy of Schelling's thought: the guiding 
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notion is rather that, if an argument can be constructed from broadly Kantian premises 
to Schellingian conclusions, then that is all to the good from the point of view of 
elucidating an undoubtedly profound but also very puzzling work, one which moreover 
may readily seem, particularly in Hegelian eyes, to be leading the post-Kantian 
development away from its rationalist core into wilder, Schopenhauerian and proto-
Heideggerean territory. The intention in short is to show that, whatever its ultimate 
degree of success, the Freiheitsschrift neither breaks with the original concerns of 
German Idealism nor leads it astray.5 
 
1. Kant's metaphysics of human freedom: the difficulty created for transcendental 
idealism by Spinozism 
 
I begin in this section with a selective and highly abbreviated account of Kant's theory 
of human freedom and the questions it raises, designed to show where Kant may be 
thought to leave matters for the purposes of the Freiheitsschrift. 
 According to Kant, although our freedom must be deemed in the final instance 
incomprehensible: 'reason would overstep all its bounds if it took it upon itself to 
explain how [...] freedom is possible'.6 What philosophy can nonetheless do is specify 
the conditions of free agency, and underwrite its incomprehensibility – there can be a 
metaphysical explanation of its resistance to rational insight, which at the same time 
reassures us of freedom's reality. The conditions Kant sets on free agency are fourfold. 
In order to act freely, it must be true that the agent could act (or could have acted) 
otherwise than she does (did). Second, the determining grounds of the action must lie 
within the agent's control or power, in meiner Gewalt. Third, their action must be 
determined not empirically but by reason. Fourth, the agent must be if not motivated 
then at least motivatable by pure practical reason, the moral law. And in order for these 
four conditions to be fulfilled, Kant argues, two metaphysical conditions have to be met. 
First, the agent must have the peculiar power of reflexive causality or spontaneous self-
determination that Kant calls transcendental freedom, defined as 'an unconditioned 
causality which begins to act of itself'. Second, the agent and her action must have 
intelligible grounds: the action must be the product of intelligible causality issuing from 
the agent's intelligible character. Kant thinks that if transcendental idealism is assumed, 
and under no other condition, can these metaphysical conditions be fulfilled.7 
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Transcendental idealism is thus a condition for the justified attribution of freedom to 
human agents. 
 For present purposes all issues concerning the grounds and interconnections of 
these various claims, along with the pressing epistemological questions surrounding 
Kant's account, can be put aside. What I want to focus on is the particular metaphysical 
difficulty that critical discussion of Kant's theory of freedom in the very earliest years of 
Kant reception brought to light. The two central figures here are Carl Christian Erhard 
Schmid, and Karl Leonhard Reinhold. Both professed themselves Kantians, believed 
that Kant's teachings on freedom require clarification, and proceeded to rework Kant's 
theory. The conclusions they came to are however diametrically opposed. According to 
Schmid, the exercise of reason must be intelligibly determined, and the intelligible 
fatalism (as he calls it) which this entails represents a consistent and defensible position 
which Kantians should espouse.8 According to Reinhold, Kant's theory must be recast in 
terms of an irreducible power of self-determination, a capacity to bring about states of 
affairs by virtue of one's so choosing and nothing else – which Reinhold, following 
Kant, calls Willkür, the power of choice that sets the self in motion, as opposed to Wille, 
the power of practical reasoning by virtue of which one merely comes to know the 
moral properties of actions.9 
 Schmid's reasoning is simply that, if no intelligible causality governs human 
agency, then freedom is reduced to mere accident, Zufall, and its moral meaning is 
destroyed, whereas intelligible determinism, Schmid asserts, is sufficient for moral 
purposes, for it (at least) lifts us out of natural causality. Reinhold, quite reasonably 
doubtful that a deterministic supersensible realm can be considered any more hospitable 
to morality than a deterministic sensible realm, argues that freedom is a basic power 
distinct from the power of practical reasoning, independent of the other powers of the 
mind and not explicable in terms of any other more fundamental concept, and no more 
mysterious than the faculty of empirical knowledge: freedom is 'fully comprehensible', 
völlig begreiflich. 
 Plainly not both of these accounts can be correct as an interpretation of Kant. It 
is also clear where their respective weaknesses lie. As another contemporary, Christian 
Andreas Leonhard Creuzer, pointed out, the strength of each is the weakness of the 
other.10 Schmid's position satisfies theoretical reason but contradicts practical reason: if 
we fail to act morally because we cannot do so, then we cannot view our immoral acts 
as effects of our reason, or regard their opposites as real possibilities; so the concepts of 
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guilt and merit fall away. Reinhold's position satisfies practical reason but is incoherent 
from the standpoint of theoretical reason, since it is absurd to postulate a cause which 
contains the sufficient basis for contradictorily opposed effects (a cause which is 
sufficient for the agent's doing A and also sufficient for the agent's doing not-A). So, 
Creuzer argues, advancing to a skeptical conclusion, the two views cancel one another 
out, and we are left with no reason to think that freedom is real, and every reason to 
think that it is a deception arising from our ignorance of the real causes of our actions. 
 That Kant's theory allowed itself to be pulled in two such contrary directions is 
of course remarkable, and leads us to ask what Kant himself made of these construals. 
We know what he thought of Reinhold from The Metaphysics of Morals, published 
several years after Reinhold's contribution, where Kant explicitly denies that the power 
of choice, Willkür, is the locus of our freedom. The concept of a power of free choice, 
freie Willkür, is not a primary but, he tells us, a derivative concept: it presupposes the 
objective legislation of Wille and signifies the mere possibility of failure to execute it.11 
To treat it as primitive and independent, Kant asserts, is either to proceed from the 
empirical phenomenon of choice, as if transcendental freedom were merely abstracted 
therefrom, or it is to suppose, incorrectly, that we have insight into that power as a 
noumenal reality. Regarding Schmid's position, Kant does not address it directly and by 
name, but there is one place in his writings, in the Critique of Practical Reason, where 
he does confront head on the threat of intelligible fatalism. This is also, as I have said, 
the point where his use of transcendental idealism in the defence human freedom runs 
into difficulty. Here is the relevant passage: 
 
But a difficulty still awaits freedom insofar as it is to be united with the 
mechanism of nature in a being that belongs to the sensible world, a difficulty 
which, even after all the foregoing has been agreed to, still threatens freedom 
with complete destruction [...] [I]f it is granted us that the intelligible subject can 
still be free with respect to a given action, although as a subject also belonging 
to the sensible world, he is mechanically conditioned with respect to the same 
action, it nevertheless seems that, as soon as one admits that God as universal 
original being is the cause also of the existence of substance (a proposition that 
can never be given up without also giving up the concept of God as the being of 
all beings and with it his all-sufficiency, on which everything depends), one 
must admit that a human being's actions have their determining ground in 
something altogether beyond his control, namely in the causality of a supreme 
being which is distinct from him and upon which his own existence and the 
entire determination of his causality absolutely depend.12 
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In such circumstances, Kant says, a human being 'would be a marionette or an 
automaton', 'built and wound up by the supreme artist; self-consciousness would indeed 
make him a thinking automaton, but the consciousness of his own spontaneity, if taken 
for freedom, would be mere delusion' – since, although the proximate determining 
causes of thought would be internal to the agent, 'the last and highest' cause would be 
'found entirely in an alien hand'. Kant explicitly refers to the threat thereby posed as 
'Spinozism'.13 
 The solution offered in the second Critique involves transcendental idealism 
once again, but deployed in a different way from the Third Antinomy of the first 
Critique. Were God the creator of beings in the sensible world, Kant tells us, then 
freedom would be annihilated; but appearances are the work of the human subject, 
whose forms of intuition are space and time. God thus cannot fix the facts in the realm 
of appearance: 
 
[T]he concept of a creation does not belong to the sensible way of representing 
existence or causality but can only be referred to noumena. Consequently, if I 
say of beings in the sensible world that they are created, I so far regard them as 
noumena. Just as it would thus be a contradiction to say that God is a creator of 
appearances, so it is also a contradiction to say that as creator he is the cause of 
actions in the sensible world and thus of actions as appearances, even though he 
is the cause of the existence of the acting beings (as noumena).14 
 
Human freedom is not itself an appearance, but human agency consists in a synthesis of 
practical reason with appearance, so if appearance falls outside the scope of divine 
determination, then so too does human agency. Insulating appearances from God's 
determining power thus makes human freedom possible. Transcendental idealism as 
invoked in response to Spinozism seeks to cut loose empirical reality metaphysically 
from things in themselves, the objects of intellectual intuition which compose Spinoza's 
ontology. Kant's argument is that, if things in themselves were the sole constituents of 
reality, then reality would not contain freedom; but there are also appearances, and this 
makes freedom possible in the face of Spinozism. 
 The difficulty is to understand the sense in which the world of appearances, 
Nature, is ours, not God's. If we push the thought, it seems there are various ways it can 
go, and that none of them work for Kant. (i) If appearance is not determined, not even 
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indirectly, by things in themselves, then it must be thought to form a sui generis reality 
beholden to nothing outside it – which is the heretical Fichtean version of 
transcendental idealism. (ii) Alternatively, if appearances are a sub-realm within the 
totality of what exists, distinguished simply by their dependence on our forms of 
sensibility, then (since reality in toto must have a rational character) there must be laws 
relating them to the whole to which they belong – whereupon appearances are 
reabsorbed into Spinoza's single substance. (iii) If appearances neither comprise sub-
items within a comprehensive reality, nor form a (Fichtean) reality of their own, then 
Kant has failed to show that freedom is anything more than a matter of how practical 
reason represents the world – and the Spinozist has no need to argue with that; the 
representation can be explained away as a function of imagination, in Spinoza's sense. 
 The difficulty we encounter here in determining the meaning of transcendental 
idealism (more readily visible to us in light of Fichte's redevelopment of Kant's 
transcendental idealism) is of a general kind and not specific to the theory of freedom: 
Are appearances merely a part of a larger reality, or are they in some way a reality of 
their own? But freedom, confronted by Spinozism, is what makes it burst forth as a 
problem, since in that context – and not in that of empirical knowledge, nor in that of 
the Third Antinomy, for in neither of those less pressurized and demanding contexts 
does the empirical/intelligible relation or the constitution of the intelligible need to be 
specified determinately – we need to be able to spell out the doctrine of transcendental 
idealism in a way which shows it to underwrite human freedom. 
 In sum, it seems that the gains that Kant makes by referring human freedom to 
an intelligible ground are offset by a fundamental problem. That the intelligible grounds 
of human agency, our intelligible character and exercise of causality of reason, are 
subject to further intelligible determining conditions is a genuine possibility, which 
nothing in Kant's system rules out; Kant gives no reason for thinking that the Principle 
of Sufficient Reason fails to apply to things in themselves. And even if this wholly 
general worry is regarded as an idle, 'merely theoretical' possibility which the interests 
of practical reason entitle us to put aside, there are two aggravating considerations 
which restore its force. 
 (i) First, the fact of human evil obliges us, as Ulrich, Schmid and Creuzer all 
point out, to regard the intelligible determination of our intelligible agency as more than 
a mere conceptual possibility: on the face of it, given Kant's identification of morality 
with pure practical reason and of the causality of reason with intelligible causality, the 
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natural inference to draw when confronted with immoral conduct is that some 
intelligible factor has impeded our intelligible agency; which gives positive reason for 
thinking that, in the intelligible domain, our agency is not causally insulated. 
 To be sure, Kant has an account of evil which precludes the postulation of any 
such extraneous intelligible factor – his doctrine of radical evil, which says that our 
intelligible disposition to give preference to incentives of self-love over moral 
incentives is rooted in an intelligible choice of that very disposition. But the motivation 
for this doctrine, the reason for affirming it, derives entirely from practical interest, our 
practice of holding ourselves and one another morally responsible, the integrity of 
which is here in question; and in any case, Kant himself admits that the postulation of 
radical evil explains nothing and generates a regress, thus failing to satisfy the Principle 
of Sufficient Reason. 
 (ii) Second, Kant leaves us at a loss when it comes to thinking up a configuration 
for the intelligible realm which would so much as grant a toehold for transcendental 
freedom. Kant denies that a Leibnizian characterization of the intelligible realm would 
be consistent with human freedom, and he in any case affirms that the correct (or at any 
rate, the most warranted) conceptualization of the intelligible realm is not Leibnizian 
but Spinozistic, which, Kant agrees, destroys human freedom directly. Kant signals his 
acceptance that the question of how things in themselves are configured has logical 
implications for the existence of human freedom when he accepts that the threat of 
Spinozism needs to be met – which he seeks to do by invoking transcendental idealism. 
But this leads to the problem indicated. 
 The problems of Kant's theory, it can now be suggested, are rooted in his dual 
component conception of human freedom. Freedom involves both intelligible causality, 
required to lift human agency out of the empirical causal network, and transcendental 
spontaneity, required to provide for the dimension of self-conscious self-determination 
or choice between alternatives. That these do not necessarily cohere is shown by the 
opposed reconstruals of Kantian freedom in Schmid and Reinhold. The explanation for 
their coming apart in the interpretation of Kant stems from the fact that he does not tell 
us which of the two is the more fundamental – which is a condition of the other, and 
which of the two human freedom ultimately consists in. Is it that we need to have an 
intelligible identity, in order that we can enjoy transcendental spontaneity, which is 
what freedom consists in? Or is transcendental spontaneity simply what makes space in 
the empirical realm for intelligible causality, which is what freedom consists in? What 
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Kant of course needs is the identification of intelligible causality and transcendental 
spontaneity, but he is not in a position to make that identification, because he has 
allowed the Principle of Sufficient Reason to stand unchallenged as the law of 
intelligible reality. Ultimately, then, the Principle of Sufficient Reason is what sets 
intelligible causality and transcendental spontaneity in conflict and upsets Kant's 
solution to the problem of human freedom. 
 This, admittedly perfunctory, assessment of Kant's solution to the problem of 
human freedom is of course contestable.15 What matters for what follows, however, is 
that it corresponds in its essentials to Schelling's estimate of Kant's legacy on the topic. 
 
2. Schelling's conception of human freedom in the Freiheitsschrift: revising Kant 
and elevating evil 
 
Schelling agrees with Kant that intelligible agency provides the key to human freedom, 
describing this as the great insight of idealism: 
 
It was, indeed, idealism which first raised the doctrine of freedom into that realm 
in which it alone is comprehensible. According to idealism, the intelligible being 
of every thing and especially of man is outside all causal connectedness as it is 
outside or above all time [...] Free action follows immediately from the 
intelligible aspect of man. (FS, 383–384) 
 
Schelling also follows Kant in denying that human freedom consists in the bare 
undetermined power of choice postulated by Reinhold ('equilibrium of choice', 
Gleichgewicht, as Schelling calls it): 
 
For the usual concept of freedom, according to which freedom is posited as a 
wholly undetermined capacity to will either one of two contradictory opposites, 
without determining reasons but simply because it is willed [...] leads to the 
greatest inconsistencies. (FS, 382) 
 
 Schelling's departures from Kant begin with his importantly different view of the 
problem set by evil and its role in relation to freedom. Schelling holds that there must be 
– for the sake of freedom – some sense in which the choice between good and evil is 
open, some sense in which they are both real options. As he puts it: '[T]he real and vital 
conception of freedom is that it is a possibility of good and evil' (FS, 352), 'a vital 
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positive power for good and evil' (FS, 354); '[if] the reality of evil [is] in some way 
denied, then the real concept of freedom vanishes' (FS, 353).16 
 Reinhold's postulation of a power intrinsically indifferent to moral distinction 
might seem to acknowledge but in fact it precludes this condition (FS, 354). It fails to 
capture the way in which the field of freedom is morally polarized; and so too does 
Kant's merely negative understanding of choice (rendering Kant's conception of 
freedom merely 'formal', as Schelling puts it17). What is required for a solution to the 
problem of evil, then, is that its ground within the agent be identified in positive terms 
and in such a way that we grasp the 'pull' of evil. 
 From this we see that an account of evil is required by Kant and Schelling for 
quite different reasons. For Kant, it is needed in order that we should be able to impute 
immoral actions to agents, that is, in order to resolve the puzzle that reason (and hence 
also freedom) is exercised even in violations of the moral law. For Schelling, it is 
required in order to give reality to freedom – a proposition which Kant would not 
accept. For Kant, the reality of freedom is given through the moral law alone. To be 
sure, the existence of evil follows from this indirectly, as a corollary, since, if we were 
not capable of departing from the moral law, then that law could not appear to us in the 
distinctive modality of a Sollen, which is the ground of our knowledge of freedom. Evil 
is therefore for Kant a negative, indirect condition of human freedom which does not 
belong directly to its very concept – as it does for Schelling. 
 This difference concerning its theoretical role entails a difference of view 
concerning what a theory of evil needs to provide. Both Kant and Schelling hold that the 
existence of evil requires us to locate within the agent a non-empirical ground of the 
will's non-conformity to the moral law – for both, evil must have an intelligible locus; 
both deny that evil is a direct function of the empirical nature in us.18 But for Kant, this 
obliges us only to construct a representation of the ground of evil that sustains the 
moral imputability of immoral actions. For Schelling, the account must explain evil in 
the considerably more substantial sense of making it intelligible that we are drawn to it, 
a datum for which inclination provides no explanation. This explains why Schelling 
cannot simply take over Kant's theory of radical evil: whether or not Kant's theory is in 
its own terms coherent, it does not do the work Schelling thinks is needed.19 
 The second and equally striking departure from Kant is Schelling's all-out 
identification of human freedom with intelligible necessity: 
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The intelligible being [of man] can, as certainly as it acts freely and absolutely, 
just as certainly act only in accordance with its own inner nature; or action can 
follow from within only in accordance with the law of identity and with absolute 
necessity, which alone is also absolute freedom. (FS, 384) 
 
This immediately raises two questions: Can this modification of Kant be motivated 
from within the theory of freedom, or does it simply reflect Schelling's general 
metaphysical differences from Kant, his move from subjective to absolute idealism? 
And if this is Schelling's view, has he not thereby embraced the intelligible fatalism 
which Kant sought to avoid (and with good reason)? 
 Schelling describes his identification of freedom with absolute necessity as a 
direct inference, not from the Kantian concept of freedom in Kant's own words, but 'as 
we believe [...] it would have to be expressed in order to be comprehensible' (FS, 384). 
Schelling therefore believes his innovation to be motivated from within the Kantian 
theory of freedom. Why does he think this? 
 If we take into account the all-or-nothing character of the predicament of human 
freedom as Kant defines it – either Spinozism or transcendental idealism – and the 
difficulty that, I argued, arises for Kant's transcendental idealism, then we can see how 
Schelling's modification of Kant can appear unavoidable, once it has been accepted that 
freedom requires an intelligible grounding. I cited two options concerning the 
interpretation of transcendental idealism. If the first, Fichtean option represents a dead 
end, as Schelling believes (for reasons relating to general metaphysics: he considers the 
Wissenschaftslehre to provide only and at most one, subject-based component of the 
system of philosophy), then that just leaves the second, the Spinozistic. This looks to 
destroy freedom so long as containment within God has the character of annihilation of 
individuality. Schelling is of course aware of this charge levelled against Spinoza – 
stemming from Leibniz but restated most recently and forcibly by Jacobi, in the form of 
a charge of global nihilism – and acknowledges that it has some basis. But, Schelling 
argues, Jacobi has misidentified the source of the threat: it is not Spinozism's monism, 
or pantheism, that is potentially nihilistic, but the 'lifelessness' of Spinoza's substance 
and the correspondingly mechanistic character of Spinoza's world-order, features which 
Schelling regards as separable from Spinozistic monism per se. So if, as Schelling 
believes, the Spinozistic system can be recast, 'spiritualized', then the world qua totality 
of things in themselves can be reconceived in a way that grounds rather than 
extinguishes individuality.20 If so, then the right strategy, in fact the only way forward 
11 
 
 
 
from Kant's transcendental idealism, is to make provision for human freedom by virtue 
of the individual's existence within God, whose intrinsic freedom man inherits by 
derivation: 'Since freedom is unthinkable in opposition to omnipotence, is there any 
other escape from this argument than to say that man is not outside, but rather in, God 
and that his activity belongs to the life of God?' (FS, 339). 
 As regards the second question raised by Schelling's identification of freedom 
with absolute necessity – the issue of intelligible fatalism – Schelling again does not 
consider that he has broken with Kant, and again it can be seen why he thinks this. 
 At first glance it may seem that Schelling with his talk of 'inner necessity' has 
reverted to the Leibnizian automaton spirituale derided by Kant. But Schelling explains 
why this is not the case. The non-empirical determination and 'absolute necessity' that 
Schelling postulates just is, he insists, self-determination, for the reason that the 
intelligible ground of free agency itself consists in a doing: 
 
[I]ndividual action results from the inner necessity of a free being and, 
accordingly, from necessity itself [...] But what then is this inner necessity of the 
being itself? Here lies the point at which necessity and freedom must be unified 
if they are at all capable of unification. Were this being a dead sort of Being [ein 
totes Sein] and a merely given one with respect to man, then, because all action 
resulting from it could do so only with necessity, responsibility 
[Zurechnungsfähigkeit] and all freedom would be abolished. But precisely this 
inner necessity is itself freedom; the essence of man is fundamentally his own 
act; necessity and freedom are in one another as one being [Ein Wesen] that 
appears as one or the other only when considered from different sides, in itself 
freedom, formally necessity. The I, says Fichte, is its own act; consciousness is 
self-positing – but the I is nothing different from this self-positing, rather it is 
precisely self-positing itself. (FS, 384–385) 
 
Here Schelling says, invoking Fichte, that the intelligible ground of freedom is not 'a 
dead sort of Being [ein totes Sein]', 'a merely given one with respect to man'; rather 'it is 
real self-positing', 'a primal and fundamental willing, which makes itself into something 
and is the ground of all ways of being [Wesenheit]'. Intelligible fatalism – 
'predestinarianism' as Schelling calls it – is avoided by locating the ground of freedom 
in a deed and not in a prior existing spiritual substance. The Kantian element of 
spontaneity and transcendental freedom is conserved in Schelling's Fichteanized version 
of the doctrine of intelligible selfhood, in so far as the 'I do—' is contained within the 
act which I am. 
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 The solution to the problem of intelligible fatalism, according to Schelling, is 
therefore to reject the assumption that the self-determining agency of the agent is 
anything separate from the agent's intelligible character: this distinction – which is 
maintained in Kant, and reflected in the opposition of Schmid's and Reinhold's 
respective reconstructions of Kantian freedom – is held to vanish. And since Schelling, 
as a critic of Fichte's idealism, cannot invoke the Wissenschaftslehre as the basis for his 
identification of the self with a deed, he will have to show that his overhauled 
Spinozism makes room for that notion. 
 The task bequeathed by Kant to Schelling, shaping Schelling's redevelopment of 
Spinoza, includes therefore the following three elements. First, Kant's theory of radical 
evil must be overhauled, since it fails to provide for the reality of evil in the strong sense 
required by Schelling. Second, if an appeal to the intelligible is to help with the problem 
of human freedom, and if the human agent cannot be separated off from the totality of 
existence by means of transcendental idealism in the way Kant proposes, then it must be 
shown that this totality is of a kind capable of containing free subjects and endowing 
them with freedom – something that Spinoza did not do (to that extent justifying Kant's 
rejection of Spinozism). Third, Kant's difficulty in uniting intelligible character with 
transcendental spontaneity must be resolved. 
 
3. A problem for Schelling's Spinozism: whence the finite? 
 
To these a fourth element must be added which, though not on the explicit agenda of the 
Freiheitsschrift, is undoubtedly on Schelling's mind in 1809, and it will be important for 
my reconstruction of his strategy. This is the problem of the derivation of the finite from 
the infinite – the question, which Schelling had wrestled with in the course of his 
attempt to formulate a Spinozistic post-Kantian idealism from 1801 to 1804, of how 
there can be a world of finite things 'in addition to' the absolute (so to speak).21 
 Karl August Eschenmayer, a fellow traveller of Schelling's Naturphilosophie 
who however entertained misgivings about his Identity Philosophy, emphasized the 
importance of this question in his 1803 Die Philosophie in ihrem Übergange zur 
Nichtphilosophie, suggesting that it was decisive for the alternatives of either a 
wissenschaftlich (Schelling) or a trans-rational glaubensphilosophisch (Eschenmayer) 
solution to the problem of the absolute.22 The question had been treated previously by 
Schelling himself on several occasions. In the 'Allgemeine Deduktion' of 1800, 
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Schelling answered the question of how something finite and real can proceed from the 
infinite, by appeal to an infinite striving of nature to return to the original identity out of 
which it was torn by an original division – which he however leaves unexplained.23 In 
the 1801 Darstellung the question was again raised and this time answered in a complex 
twofold manner, by on the one hand rejecting its presupposition 'that absolute identity 
has actually stepped beyond itself', and on the other hand relativizing the separation of 
individual being from the absolute to reflection which has already withdrawn and 
isolated itself from the absolute centre.24 In Bruno (1802) Schelling employed a closely 
similar if not the same strategy, again insisting on the containment of the finite within 
the eternal, and referring the separateness of the finite to the perspective of the finite.25 
Now the question raised by the Darstellung-Bruno solution is whether it reduces the 
reality of the finite to a matter of representation. Does the existence of the finite consist 
in nothing more than the mere (mis)representation of its existence? Schelling's answer 
is not clear: the finite actualizes, he says, a possibility for viewing (or 'positing') itself as 
separated, a possibility which is supplied for it by the absolute. Whether this allows the 
finite to exist in any sense beyond representation – and therefore, whether the 
'actualization' or self-positing-as-finite yields anything sufficiently robust to deflect the 
nihilism charge – is uncertain. Equally uncertain is how the absolute, conceived as 
absolute identity and absolute reason, can bestow on its modes or 'contents' even the 
mere idea of separate existence, or leave room for its formation, as is presumably 
required for the relevant self-positing, let alone endow an entity with the power of 
actualizing the idea. This is the gravamen of Eschenmayer's objection. Schelling's reply 
to Eschenmayer in Philosophie und Religion (1804) is again not free from ambiguity. 
Schelling declares abruptly that there is no continuous transition to the finite, which he 
now describes as a result of the Fall, Abfall, whereby the world, as the other (Gegenbild) 
of the absolute, rests not on the absolute's processing out from itself but on the finite's 
falling away from it.26 Doubts remain. Philosophie und Religion may be read either as 
reiterating, in a new vocabulary, the account given in the Darstellung, or as 
propounding a new doctrine. If the Abfall is indeed a new proposal, then it has not been 
made clear why it counts as a full solution in a way that the 'original division' adduced 
in 1800 and the perspectival account of the Darstellung and Bruno do not – if only 
because the doctrine of Abfall still seems exactly poised between rejecting the question 
and attempting to answer it. 
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 This problem may be viewed as the successor in Schelling to the problem 
confronting Kant's transcendental idealism. Kant's problem of granting appearances 
sufficient autonomy to make freedom possible, without allowing them to form a sui 
generis reality displacing things in themselves, becomes in Schelling the task of 
balancing the absolute's claim to reality with that of finite entities; the issue is again one 
of ontological competition at a wholly general metaphysical level, precipitated and 
made acute by its implications for human freedom. And here Kant's defenders may 
reasonably object that Schelling's Spinozistic turn, in failing to rationalize the existence 
of the world as a site of finite agency without invoking a duality of incommensurable 
perspectives, has not delivered what it promised: the difficulties of transcendental 
idealism have simply reappeared in a new form, in confirmation of the Kantian doctrine 
that claims to cognition of the unconditioned, even when not caught in contradictions, 
are necessarily futile in relation to the purposes of human reason. 
 It would seem therefore that relocating human freedom in the context of a new 
post-Kantian and post-Spinozistic metaphysics requires more to be said concerning the 
problem of deriving the finite. In the Freiheitsschrift Schelling implies that, aside from 
the problem of freedom and evil which has still to be dealt with, all is well with the 
system of idealism, suggesting perhaps that he takes himself to have solved the problem 
in his 1804 Philosophie und Religion. However that may be – that is, whether or not the 
1804 account is adequate, and whatever Schelling thinks about it – it is also true, I will 
argue, that the Freiheitsschrift offers a different solution to the problem of the finite, 
and one which is more convincing. 
 
4. The metaphysics of the Freiheitsschrift: theogony and the creation of free beings 
 
We have seen what form the solution must take, but what is its content? Here is an 
extremely compressed statement of the metaphysics of the Freiheitsschrift. It draws off 
Jakob Böhme and Plotinus, and takes the shape of a theogony: 
 
Since nothing is prior to, or outside of [außer], God, he must have the ground of 
his existence [Grund seiner Existenz] in himself. All philosophies say this; but 
they speak of this ground as of a mere concept without making it into something 
real [reell] and actual [wirklich]. This ground of his existence, which God has in 
himself, is not God considered absolutely, that is, in so far as he exists; for it is 
only the ground of his existence. It is nature – in God, a being indeed 
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inseparable, yet still distinct, from him. [...] If we want to bring this way of 
being closer to us in human terms, we can say: it is the yearning [Sehnsucht] the 
eternal One feels to give birth to itself. The yearning is not the One itself but is 
after all co-eternal with it. The yearning wants to give birth to God, that is, 
unfathomable unity, but in this respect there is not yet unity in the yearning 
itself. Hence, it is, considered for itself, also will; but will in which there is no 
understanding [...] This is the incomprehensible base of reality in things, the 
indivisible remainder, that which with the greatest exertion cannot be resolved in 
understanding but rather remains eternally in the ground. (FS, 357–360) 
 
Schelling starts with a distinction, 'the distinction between being in so far as it exists 
[dem Wesen, 
sofern es existirt] and being in so far as it is merely the ground of existence [dem 
Wesen, sofern es bloß Grund von Existenz ist]' (FS, 357), which he says must apply to 
all things – God included. So with respect to God we must distinguish his existence as 
God, from the ground of his existence – which, Schelling says, should be conceived as 
indeterminate objectless will or as longing or yearning. The implicit object of this 
primal will or longing, the final cause which draws it out of itself, is understanding and 
self-consciousness, knowing itself as something existing, a formed unity. When this 
development is complete, we have God as God. The ground of God's existence has not 
however been consumed or sublated in this process – Schelling refers to it as an 
'indivisible remainder', and it abides as the ground which continues to give God being as 
God. God has therefore an internal complexity, comprehending two principles, one 
rational and one pre-rational; principles of light and darkness, as Schelling calls them. 
 Were Schelling a theist, the next step would be the creation of man and world, as 
a separate and further matter; which would involve God's exercising will and 
judgement, in the way that Leibniz supposes, and which, Schelling believes, renders the 
problems of evil and human freedom insoluble. But on Schelling's pantheistic account, 
man and the world result not from a separate act of creation but come to be in the course 
of God's self-genesis – their existence is implicated in God's becoming, and God does 
not come to completion without man and world. And this implies – what is crucial for 
Schelling's theory of evil – that the same duality of principles that makes up the being of 
God also makes up the being of man (and other creatures): the distinction of existence 
and ground of existence, principles of light and darkness, applies to man as it does to 
God – but with the essential difference that while these principles are inseparable in 
God (who is a necessary unity) they are separable in man. And this yields the possibility 
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of evil: a condition in which the principles have come apart, the non-rational principle 
of darkness claiming for itself an independent existence. Evil consists in striving to give 
oneself, wilfully claiming for oneself, a selfhood independent of God. The locus of evil 
thus lies for Schelling, as it does for Kant, in the disposition of the individual subject, 
and the determination of this disposition, the individual's decision for either good or 
evil, takes place (as per the Fichtean conception of the being of the self as that of an act) 
at the point where the individual comes into existence, a point not in time but eternity. 
 
Man is in the initial creation, as shown, an undecided being – (which may be 
portrayed mythically as a condition of innocence that precedes this life and as an 
initial blessedness) – only man himself can decide. But this decision cannot 
occur within time; it occurs outside of all time and, hence, together with the first 
creation (though as a deed distinct from creation). Man, even if born in time, is 
indeed created into the beginning of the creation (the centrum). The act, whereby 
his life is determined in time, does not itself belong to time but rather to eternity: 
it also does not temporally precede life but goes through time (unhampered by 
it) as an act which is eternal by nature. Through this act the life of man reaches 
to the beginning of creation; hence, through it man is outside the created, being 
free and eternal beginning itself. As incomprehensible as this idea may appear to 
conventional ways of thinking, there is indeed in each man a feeling in accord 
with it as if he had been what he is already from all eternity and had by no 
means become so first in time. (FS, 385–386) 
 
5. The strategy of the Freiheitsschrift: analysis and interpretation 
 
The preceding is a very compressed and incomplete précis, in which two compact 
passages from Schelling have been asked to assume the main burden, but it supplies 
enough for us to now be able to grasp how the Freiheitsschrift offers a complex solution 
to the four problems identified as its targets. I argued that Schelling aims to (1) identify 
the positive ground of evil, (2) explain how free individuality can reside within God, (3) 
explain how intelligible necessity can coincide with spontaneous self-determination, and 
(4) account for the possibility of the finite world. Schelling takes these apparently 
independent problems and proceeds to solve them in the manner of simultaneous 
equations, that is, by cross-referring them to one another. The reality of evil appears to 
set an insoluble problem, not just to Kant but to all metaphysics, for the reasons that 
Schelling goes over in the early part of the Freiheitsschrift – in short, because no 
coherent way of introducing evil into the fabric of being can be conceived (at any rate: 
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as philosophers have hitherto conceived being). And the existence of the finite world 
appears to set an insoluble problem for monism, so long as the absolute is conceived as 
an absolute identity – the problem that Schelling's Identity Philosophy had left 
unresolved. But when the existence of evil and the existence of the finite world are 
taken together as interconnected primary data for metaphysical speculation, the basis is 
laid for the account we have seen Schelling give of God's genesis and our genesis in-
and-with God, through which the problems associated with each are dissolved. (Re 4:) 
We discover in human evil the reason why there is a world of finite things, in so far as 
the structure of free human personality – its unity of opposing principles – articulates a 
ground which makes the existence of the finite world intelligible. We now understand 
why the problem of the finite world proved intractable for the system of absolute 
identity, forcing it into equivocation, and why the doctrine of Abfall in Philosophie und 
Religion – when read in light of, and as anticipating, the standpoint of the 
Freiheitsschrift – counts as a solution in a way that Schelling's early proposals do not. 
(Re 1:) This ground27 entails the reality and necessity of evil, without either making 
God the root of evil or resorting to Gnosticism.28 (Re 3:) If the genesis of the human 
subject out of God recapitulates, indeed sub-coincides with, God's self-genesis, then the 
same identity of being and acting, of intelligible character and spontaneity, as obtains in 
God can and must find itself reproduced in the human individual. The problematic 
duality in Kant's conception of freedom, reflected in the Schmid-Reinhold opposition, is 
thereby eliminated. At the same time, Schelling has protected intelligible causality from 
intelligible fatalism, without invoking an indeterministic power of choice:29 because 
man is created with and in God's self-creation, and is not the effect of an act of creation 
as per Leibniz, we do not stand under, we are not subject to, God's determination; 
instead we partake of God's own dynamic and creative, self-individualized nature. (Re 
2:) It is thereby also explained how free individuality can reside within God, answering 
squarely Jacobi's charge of nihilism. 
 Assuming this to be a correct analysis of Schelling's strategy, let me now say 
how I think it is ultimately grounded. The Freiheitsschrift may be interpreted as taking 
the structure of free human personality – rather than merely the structure of theoretical 
and practical self-consciousness, which does indeed belong to its core but which does 
not constitute it as a whole – as the guiding principle for the construction of 
metaphysics.30 The structure which Schelling finds in man and imputes to God is that of 
conditioned autonomy or what Schelling calls 'derivative absoluteness', derivirte 
18 
 
 
 
Absolutheit (FS, 347), and this is what his asymmetric dyad of existence and ground-of-
existence is intended to elucidate. Schelling arrives at this conception in the 
Freiheitsschrift31 not by any epistemological or directly theoretical metaphysical route 
but by extrapolation from what Kant calls the practical point of view. The extrapolations 
are not however mere 'practical cognitions' in the sense of postulates validated by their 
function for practical reason, such as those which comprise Kant's moral theology.32 
Schelling's argument from from the practical sphere to the theoretical should instead be 
viewed in the terms proposed by Paul Franks as a general way of understanding the 
development of German Idealism. Franks argues that Kant's deduction of the moral law 
in the second Critique, his account of the Fact of Reason, provides a template for 
German Idealism, which adopts the strategy of deducing an ontic ground – in German 
Idealism: the actuality of the intelligible ground of the world, the ens realissimum – 
from an epistemic ground, our consciousness of the normativity of pure reason.33 In 
these terms, what may be said of Schelling is that he in the Freiheitsschrift repeats the 
exercise of the second Critique on an amplified and modified basis: whereas Kant in the 
Deduction restricts the data to the single, normatively positive fact of respect for the 
moral law – as befits his aim to justify the moral law – and defers consideration of the 
ground of evil to another, secondary context, Schelling admits evil into the primary 
data. Now evil is not the absence, but the inverse or negation of normativity. So in 
Schelling what we work out from, the epistemic ground which leads to an ontic ground, 
is not simple one-sided awareness of obligation qua respect for the moral law, but 
complex two-sided awareness of, on the one side, respect for the moral law, and on the 
other side, the non-necessity, grounded in one's will, of determining oneself in 
conformity with the moral law consequent upon one's own repudiation of it. On this 
basis Kant's conception of human freedom is revised, while Kantian radical evil is 
transposed down a level: it is no longer merely a theoretical posit with auxiliary 
regulative significance, but has become part of the 'factual' (in Kant's sense) normative 
given. Kant's Fact of Reason thus becomes in Schelling the double fact of reason and 
correlative unreason, with all of the resulting metaphysical differences. The derivation 
of general metaphysics from the practical point of view is based, therefore, on practical 
cognition in Kant's primary sense of knowledge of our own intelligible causality. 
 The feature of the opposition of good and evil that allows it to play a privileged 
role in metaphysical construction is the asymmetry regarding their respective relations 
to Reason: as Kant's analysis reveals, good is what there must be reason to do, while 
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evil is what there cannot be reason to do; the choice between good and evil is thus no 
choice at all; and yet we do choose between them, we are presented with a choice 
between them; meaning that the boundary of the space of reasons does not determine 
the limit of what we are acquainted with as having reality. The pair good/evil, one of 
which lies inside the space of reasons and the other outside, the two nonetheless being 
inseparably united, furnishes the conceptual form employed by Schelling to grasp being 
as such, the duality of Grund and Existenz: being as such is thought as having the shape 
and character of the opposition of good and evil. It follows that, since the opposition of 
good and evil is an opposition of what is reason to what is not reason, Schelling has 
pushed speculative thought beyond the Principle of Sufficient Reason – meaning that 
the principle which, in its unrestricted form, posed the original threat to human freedom, 
and which Kant aimed to merely suspend with the aid of transcendental idealism, has 
finally been disarmed. Ultimately this is achieved through Schelling's reconception of 
human freedom as encompassing good and evil, whereby it encompasses the negation 
of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (and is therefore immunized against objections to 
human freedom deploying that principle).34 
 Let me try to make clearer my suggestion that the opposition of good and evil in 
some way exhibits, gives oblique access to, the dislocation or disunity within being 
which Schelling expresses in terms of his distinction of existence from its ground. This 
distinction, on which the whole argument of the Freiheitsschrift turns, involves a 
modification of our understanding of ontological talk, and is intended as revisionary; as 
if to underline its revisionary character, Schelling intimates that the ground of existence 
is tainted with non-being, that is, cannot itself be said unequivocally to exist or have 
being. Schelling's thesis concerning being is therefore not simply that it has 
fundamentally different types, on a par with the distinction of Nature and Spirit, or of 
the potential and the actual: it is that there is a complexity and conceptual opacity in 
being which is concealed in plain ontological assertion, such that the notion of 
something's simply existing or having existence, simply 'being the case', is defective. 
The assumption that existence as such is transparent and non-complex is present in, but 
not confined to, ordinary understanding: it extends to the highest speculative systems, 
Spinoza's and Hegel's included. Hegel says in the Encyclopaedia Logic that, although 
we cannot stop with mere being, and although being is not firm and ultimate and will be 
seen to turn dialectically into its opposite, it is nonetheless absurd to regard any content 
of consciousness as 'beside' and 'outside' being, or as 'additional' to it.35 This assumption 
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of absolute primitive simplicity, which allows Hegel to set 'pure being' (the 'pure 
thought' of what is 'quite simply being', eben nur das Sein ist) at the beginning of his 
Logic, is what Schelling must be taken to be challenging. The rival position articulated 
in the Freiheitsschrift is that the non-simplicity of being is attested in our knowledge of 
good and evil, and of ourselves as entities for whom both are possibilities – something 
which would not be possible if existence were the simple thing that it is taken to be in 
the ontologies of common sense, Spinoza, and Hegel. In sum, Schelling's argument is 
that, if existence were the bare and simple fact that it is naturally and universally taken 
to be, then it would be impossible for anything to exist with the possibility for good or 
evil, and since the practical point of view reveals that such a being does exist, existence 
cannot be simple. Though good and evil are necessarily unified – in so far as both fall 
within the span of a self's field of decision – the distance that separates them, the degree 
and kind of their opposition to one another, is too great to be contained within a single 
domain of 'existing things'. If we are to think both good and evil as having being, as we 
must, then the ordinary concept of being must be reconfigured. 
 Can Schelling be said to have explained the existence of evil, freedom, and the 
finite, in the Freiheitsschrift? Has he made freedom and evil comprehensible in the 
sense denied by Kant? At one level, it would seem so. What emerges from the enquiry 
is a unified systematic solution to several problems, according to which God, the world, 
man, human freedom, and evil, can all be derived from the structure of being. So we 
have metaphysical explanation in the full and proper sense. And as Schelling 
emphasizes in the close of the essay, the Freiheitsschrift does the work of a traditional 
theodicy, supplanting Leibniz: it has been shown that God is as he needs to be, and does 
all that needs to be done, in order for the highest value to be realized; evil has positive 
reality, yet all is for the best. Putting it like this, however, misses something important, 
the very thing that distinguishes the Freiheitsschrift from other treatments of the 
problem of evil. The crux of Schelling's strategy, I suggested, lies in repositioning the 
relevant explananda – freedom and evil – at the outer limit of philosophical 
understanding, and in showing that this limit cannot be regarded as subjective, a 
consequence of the limits of our cognitive powers, but must be regarded as objective, as 
marking the point where being extends beyond reason. If so, then Schelling's aim cannot 
be to explain freedom and evil, for what he shows is that freedom and evil are 
necessarily and in themselves ungrounded. The aim must be, instead, to exhibit freedom 
and evil as ultimate ontological facts, features of being that could not be consequences 
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of anything more fundamental. Thus one might say that Schelling has eliminated the 
incomprehensibility of freedom asserted by Kant, but without providing a 
comprehension of freedom; and, with reference to the problem of evil, that what 
Schelling has done is to allow the question, Why is there evil?, to receive the answer, 
For no reason – he has supplied conditions under which this counts as the complete and 
correct answer. The Freiheitsschrift may do the work of the Theodicy in exonerating 
God and reconciling us to existence, but the means employed are the reverse of 
Leibniz's. 
 
I referred at the outset to the issue of Schelling's place in the German Idealist 
development. It is not hard to see why it may be thought, in view of the Böhme-
influenced story of God's self-genesis which stands at its centre, that the Freiheitsschrift 
should be interpreted not as yet more metaphysics, but rather as implying the 
abandonment altogether of metaphysics conceived as a task of explanation, and as 
anticipating later philosophical developments – Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Schopenhauer 
to some extent – which make that theme explicit.36 The account I have offered does not, 
however, support this assessment, in so far as (I hope to have shown) the doctrinal 
philosophical content of the Freiheitsschrift can be arrived at by continuous 
(constructive, yet warranted) steps from a Kantian starting point. That Schelling must be 
regarded as revising the ground-consequent form of metaphysical explanation does not 
mean he is abandoning it; that the Freiheitsschrift affirms the reality of Unreason in 
some sense does not entail either a leap out of Reason or its delegitimation, since what 
Schelling means to do in it is precisely to plot the relation of 'Unreason' to Reason by 
consideration of what metaphysical explanation requires.37 It is true nonetheless that a 
clearer view is needed of the status the theogony, which might be interpreted not as a 
metaphysics meant to replace the Identity Philosophy after it has been pushed as far as it 
can go, but instead as a mythological presentation of a philosophical insight which 
receives its officially correct formulation in logical theory.38 This is a difficult question, 
concerning which Schelling perhaps did not have clear and definite views in 1809, and 
which the Weltalter texts do not fully settle either, eventually finding itself overtaken by 
his distinction of 'negative' and 'positive' philosophies. The Freiheitsschrift thus looks 
forward in Schelling's development, at the same time offering a resolution of the aporiae 
of his early work.39 
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